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Abstract   
Plural values contribute to multiple arrays of expressed preferences. Conventionally, 
preference convergence towards consensus among initially disagreeing decision 
makers is understood in terms of diminishing value differences. A cogent account of 
consensual decision that respects non-diminishing value plurality is lacking. Instead 
there is a theoretic expectation for categorical consistency between subjective values 
and expressed preferences. Valuing agents in social interaction are expected to 
indicate identical preference orderings only if they hold correspondingly identical 
categories of values. This expectation precludes meaningful conceptualization of 
preference convergence under divisive normative dispositions. An alternative 
framework is proposed and illustrated by results from a designed deliberative forum 
on Australia’s climate change policy. Data were analyzed based on Q methodology. 
Results shows that small-group deliberations enabled effective communication 
between distinctive subjective positions and broadened understandings between 
individuals. While a consensual decision gained progress, no identified value 
discourse diminished below a significant degree. Observed changes in values did not 
run parallel to the converging preferences, suggesting a decline in value-preference 
consistency. These changes nonetheless are amenable to the principle of value 
pluralism. An alternative rationality concept is needed to account for this moral ideal 
within economics.   
 
Keywords: value pluralism; preference transformation; deliberative monetary 
valuation; communicative rationality; public deliberation; climate change  
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1. Introduction 
Communication can facilitate reciprocal understanding and recognition between 
individuals. Non-strategic cooperation under disputed values and beliefs1 involves a 
form of rationality prevalent in the communicative practice of everyday life. The 
underlying rationality criteria could fruitfully inform articulation of plural values and 
reconstruction of the theory of environmental valuation towards value pluralism. Yet 
the idea remains a matter of normative advocacy in ecological economics in need of 
more conceptual coherence and empirical investigation. 
Individuals have different normative dispositions concerning the allocation 
and distribution of public resources across sectors of society. Mainstream economists 
brush aside any category distinction and hold that such dispositions are reducible to a 
single metric, whereas ecological economists embrace the notion of value pluralism in 
an effort to reveal the multiple facets of environmental values. Each of the two 
economic traditions has developed new approaches of environmental valuation in the 
wake of the deliberative turn (Zografos and Howarth, 2008; Lo and Spash, in press). 
They are nevertheless found to share a deterministic presupposition that precludes 
recognition of the rationality of informed and respectful communication which may 
1 This paper focuses on the differences in values, beliefs and preferences between individuals. Values 
are understood as personal judgements or dispositions as to what is right or desirable, and assumed to 
be a fundamental subjective construct preceding formation of preference, which refers to a ranking of 
alternatives and is seen as the immediate precursor of personal choices. Neoclassical economics 
assumes the otherwise that preference precedes value. In this paper values and preferences are treated 
as two qualitatively different parameters, without addressing their cognitive sequence.  
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seemingly imply the ‘failure’ of individuals to achieve defined moral ends. 
In mainstream economics the individual is seen as a utility maximizer holding 
consistent, complete, and transient preference (Gowdy, 2004, 2007; Spash, 2007; van 
den Bergh, 1996). The ideal economic person would make choices as a rational 
consumer exclusively pursuing material self-interest. Preference utilitarianism 
constitutes an implicit value theory of economics (O'Neil et al., 2008; Söderbaum, 
2008). Based on these assumptions, economists measure the value of environmental 
goods and services in monetary terms by constructing hypothetical markets or making 
inference from a surrogate market. In the valuation process, environmental values are 
treated as reducible to consumer preferences (Sagoff, 1988; Vadnjal and O'Connor, 
1994; Vatn, 2005). Preference is elicited in ways that the implicit value theory 
permits, typically in the form of willingness-to-pay (WTP) or willingness-to-accept 
(WTA). Expressed WTP/WTA is expected to be consistent with the utilitarian 
conception of values. Any deviation from this assumption is regarded as irrational. 
Ecological economics rests upon a different set of assumptions in contrast to 
the distorted picture of human behaviours and ethics depicted by the neoclassical 
approach (Gowdy, 2007; Lo, 2012; O'Connor, 2000; Spash, 2012; van den Bergh et 
al., 2000; Vatn, 2009). Within the field there is increasing advocacy of deliberative 
research methods in an effort to broaden the scope of economics research (Christie et 
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al., 2012; Kesting, 2010; Lennox et al., 2011; Norgaard, 2007; Zografos and Howarth, 
2008) and ‘moralize’ preferences (Spash, 2007). Multidisciplinary efforts contributed 
to this deliberative turn 2 , which has produced alternative principles of social 
cooperation compatible with the concept of sustainability. Many practitioners are 
committed to the ethical and/or behavioural premises at variation with the 
neoclassical paradigm of personhood.  
However, these alternatives do not constitute a defensible account of value 
pluralism. Lo and Spash (in press) have noted a remarkable division of practice in the 
methodological development of deliberative monetary valuation (DMV), which 
involves the use of deliberative methods in environmental valuation to support social 
construction and reconstruction of preference. Some DMV practitioners attempt to 
move economics away from value monism by introducing concepts of social 
interaction to address the failed neoclassical assumption of isolated individuals. 
Problems arise, however, as the reorientation of the established ethical or behavioural 
premises is predisposed to a particular system of values and preferences. 
Consequently these accounts of environmental valuation are caught in a conceptual 
incoherence of being compatible with tendency for diminishing value plurality3.  
2 The deliberative turn has been observed in many other fields, notably political science (Dryzek, 
2000). The theoretical foundation can be attributed to the pioneering work of John Dewey (1923) and 
Jürgen Habermas (1984).  
3 Value plurality means that a larger number of different types of values exists, whereas pluralism is a 
normative principle that allows for an appreciation of plurality. 
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I shall argue that the conceptual resources essential to develop a pluralistic 
account of economics need not be sought from the antithesis of neoclassical 
economics. For pluralism requires the individual be able to seek terms of cooperation 
that opponents accept. A model of rationality is required which moves beyond the 
present focus on the integrity of personhood and toward the capacity for reciprocal 
understanding and interpersonal coordination of actions. The concept of 
‘communicative rationality’ could provide a basic theoretical structure for this 
endeavour.  
This paper illustrates the idea and sheds light on a critical normative aspect of 
the prospective pluralistic economics. Specifically, it addresses the lack of a 
defensible account for value pluralism in the conceptual development of deliberative 
valuation methods. A retrospective interpretative framework is proposed for the 
analysis of deliberative WTP and policy recommendations. 
An empirical study of DMV is presented using data from a designed 
deliberative forum on Australia’s climate policy. Climate policy was chosen as the 
theme of the forum because it proved to be a highly contentious issue in Australia due 
to disappointing changes of official political commitments, motivating the divisive 
debates in the community at the time of research. This justified the use of the 
deliberative approach which presumes the existence of irreducible conflicts in values 
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and beliefs (Dryzek, 2000; Lo, 2011a). The data are analysed following the basic 
procedures of ‘Q methodology’ to ascertain the changes in values and beliefs as a 
result of deliberation. To begin with, I elaborate on an established epistemic premise 
that poses challenge to the endeavour of value pluralism. 
 
2. Methodological requirements of value pluralism 
2.1 Economics in search of consistent expression of values and preferences  
Both traditions of economics seek to strengthen the internal consistency between the 
expressed preference and subjective state of the individual. That is, what they do or 
intend to do (means) should accord with what their desires or aspirations dictate 
(ends). Substantive theories and techniques have been developed to attain desired 
ends at the expense of their alternatives.  
Mainstream economists, along with some decision scientists, downplay the 
rationality of respondents failing to take utilitarian considerations as theory predicts 
(Lo, 2011a). There is an expectation that expressed preference should accord with the 
implicit economic theory of value or a modified one based on behavioural 
psychological models (Powe, 2007). Non-utilitarian preferences in group processes 
are then deemed to be an erred expression in need of correction (Bateman et al., 2008; 
Hanley and Shogren, 2005).  Decision support to modify preferences is seen as 
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necessary when people make choice in ways that fail to address their values - defined 
mainly in utilitarian terms (Gregory et al., 1993). Thus the favoured mode of DMV 
has been in the form of student tutorial (Gregory et al., 1993) or educational workshop 
(Urama and Hodge, 2006).  
For example MacMillan et al. (2002, 2006) and Álvarez-Farizo et al. (2009) 
propose a ‘market stall’ approach of DMV predicated upon the idea that consumers do 
interact in markets rather than collect purchases in isolation. Participants are 
encouraged to make choices as a consumer and adopt the utility maximization rules, 
as in Gregory et al. (1993). To Zoltán (2011), DMV is a tool to reduce protest 
response to conform to standard economic theory. Clearly the objective has been to 
improve validity for an exchange value (Spash, 2007). Lo and Spash (in press) 
describe these attempts as “preference economisation”, which pursues consistency 
between stated WTP and the standard economic theory of value. 
Ecological economists favour a different set of principles by which expressed 
preference can be rendered rational. In general there is an affinity for a citizen frame 
based on the view that respondents making judgements on environmental issues 
should be enabled to articulate public-interested or even impartial preferences 
(Costanza, 2000; Pelletier, 2010; Sagoff, 1988, 1998; Vatn, 2009; Wilson and 
Howarth, 2002). This approach is built upon an alternative theory of value blending 
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multiple philosophical accounts, of which the more influential are Sagoff’s (1988) 
‘citizens values’ thesis and John Rawls’s (1971) theory of justice. There are variations 
as to which account is more plausible, but these have not precluded the evolution of a 
value theory and behavioural model that explicitly recognize environmental values 
and the well-being of the larger society and future generations (Douai, 2009; Gowdy, 
2004; Söderbaum, 2008).  
Innovative methods for preference elicitation have been proposed to fulfil this 
moral commitment. Plottu and Plottu (2007, p. 56), for example, develop a concept 
known as ‘social cost-benefit analysis II and III’, which is designed to support 
decisions that ‘transcend purely individual horizon to symbolize collective and 
patrimonial stakes’. To elicit ‘social WTP’ Mill et al. (2007) modify the contingent 
valuation method by asking respondents to adopt a ‘social/citizen viewpoint’. These 
attempts affirm the relevance and importance of collective values and, on this basis, 
develop conceptually (and ethically) consistent techniques. As Gasparatos (2010) 
suggests, the choice of evaluation tool should be consistent with the type of values 
being assessed; for example DMV is appropriate when altruistic values are concerned.  
Attempts to advance the alternative theory of value characterize the 
‘preference moralization’ approach of DMV (Lo and Spash, in press).  This approach 
involves isolation of non-utilitarian or public-interested considerations by engaging 
 8 
respondents in group deliberations (Brown et al., 1995; Howarth and Wilson, 2006; 
Sagoff, 1998; Soma and Vatn, 2010). Advocates believe that deliberation is a proper 
site for valuation as people make judgements about environmental issues in the 
capacity of ‘citizen’ and citizens exchange opinions and deliberate in public arenas 
(Sagoff, 1988).  
For example, Wilson and Howarth’s (2002) DMV approach is based on 
Rawls’s theory of justice and seeks to encourage individual participants to re-shape 
preferences in terms of consensus values for ecosystem goods and services. 
Construction of citizen-type preferences is treated as an end itself, whereas 
deliberation as a means to induce the congenial value positions, e.g. rights-based 
values. This approach presupposes a singular conception of values that could bring 
about a corresponding alignment of expressed preferences conducive to social 
cooperation. The use of deliberative methods is instrumental, i.e. experimentally 
creating a controlled public space in order to motivate pro-environmental behaviour. 
There is, however, counter-evidence suggesting that deliberation may induce 
environmental sceptical responses (Dietz et al., 2009).  More importantly, contrary to 
the expectations of its advocates, this alternative approach is conceptually compatible 
with diminishing plurality of values (Lo and Spash, in press). 
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2.2 Limited potential for value pluralism  
Both of the two economic traditions have a substantive moral foundation upon which 
a set of theories and methodological principles is established to guide the transition 
toward an ideal social state which is seen as a favoured alternative to the other’s 
model. A common methodological intent is to induce or modify individuals’ 
preferences so as to reduce the moral differences among themselves, which are likely 
to impede consensual coordination of their social or political actions toward 
comprehensive social changes. Outcomes of the coordination are expected to accord 
exclusively with the behavioural prescriptions of the respective favoured moral ends 
(e.g. citizen-type responses). An effective coordination then requires isolation from 
alternative prescriptions (e.g. consumer-type responses).  
The required transformation of preference and behaviour connotes a negative 
relationship between the possibility of conscious and non-coercive cooperation 
between actors of the society and the diversity of values attributed to them (Lo, in 
press). Greater diversity raises the costs of isolation, rendering the coordination less 
effective. This tendency characterizes the deliberative turn in ecological economics 
(Lo and Spash, in press).   
Deliberative research methods have been introduced to advance the integrity 
of personhood in terms of categorical consistency between one’s own subjective 
 
values and expressed preferences. There is an expectation that individuals in 
interaction should indicate identical preference orders only if they hold 
correspondingly identical categories of values. Strengthening this causal relation, 
however, precludes non-strategic cooperation and production of consensual collective 
decision in pluralist societies, because conflicts between individual actors are 
effectively encouraged to persist. Given that any tendency for convergence on 
preferences must evolve in parallel to a corresponding convergence on values, 
normative uniformity becomes a structural condition for a sensible agreement on a 
course of action to issue from a group of informed and rational individuals who 
express different private desires or aspirations. Should their individual actions, or 
expressed support to an action, be systematically coordinated and oriented to their 
compatible moral ends exclusively, agreement on a collective action could be reached 
only if the interaction is geared toward morally undifferentiable considerations. 
Consequently, either agreed actions are obstructed (Figure 1), or the state of value 
pluralism is not attained (Figure 2). These two possibilities are illustrated with the 
example of carbon pricing which is the main theme of the case study presented later 
in this paper. 
 
Figures 1 and 2 About Here 
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 The emphasis on the value-preference consistency may constrain the capacity 
of economists to reconcile the seemingly competing goals of deriving consensual 
actions and attaining the state of value pluralism. As economics is turning its focus 
from the putative dominance of social isolates to the realities of collective life, the 
ways in which social interactions alter the subjective landscape of the individual’s 
internal world as a process of communicative rationalization need clarifications in 
order to make the theory of social cooperation compatible with the principle of 
pluralism. Most of the previous attempts, however, overlook the nature of irreducible 
conflicts.  
Common to both traditions of economics is the vision that rationality is 
proprietary property of individual decision makers; it should be sought from only the 
ways in which the individual makes sense of the world and behaves consistently. 
Social interaction is then regarded as more of a ‘transformational intervention’ 
(Brouwer et al., 1999, p. 342) than a rationalization process when it is believed to 
create disruptions to the value-preference consistency, such as making a climate 
sceptic to express support to greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation or asking a citizen-
type respondent to submit consumer preference. The latter constitutes a ‘category 
mistake’ as articulated by Sagoff (1988, 1998) who advocates DMV as a better 
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approach to elicit preference in consonance with a singular conception of values. The 
lack of consistency is generally considered as a sign of irrational response or mistaken 
observation. The common strategy of driving desired behavioural changes precludes a 
theory of social cooperation that is amenable to ever growing diversity of values4. 
Maintaining value plurality comes into conflict with narrowing down the range of 
expressed preferences that complicates cooperation so long as a causal relationship 
between values and preferences is taken for granted5.  
Unreflectively pursuing such consistency threatens to exhaust our capacity to 
recognize and conceptualize auspices and conditions of cooperative actions that are 
socially and rationally coordinated in the circumstance of deep value conflict. Non-
strategic cognitive motivations intrinsic to communication are out of range. Current 
models of economic rationality miss the richness of human motivations that drive 
communication. An alternative concept of rationality is needed to make economics 
amenable to the principle of value pluralism while creating capacity for cooperative 
actions. This endeavour may benefit from the notion of communicative rationality 
(Habermas, 1984) which is introduced in the next section. 
4 When people in social interaction are characterized by an increasing number of subjective 
dispositions, they become subject to a broader range of behavioural influences from each other. 
Reflection upon preference and modification of behaviour are more likely to occur. The higher 
likelihood of reconsideration makes the required consistency harder to attain to the extent in which 
values are more deeply held and harder to change than preference or behavior (otherwise the endeavor 
of value pluralism would lose importance). 
5 This is not to deny the existence of such causal relationship, but to suggest that further enhancement 
of such relationship needs not be seen as an imperative of research into environmental values. 
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 2.3 Communicative rationality for a pluralistic economics 
A theory of social cooperation specifies the conditions on which actors coordinate 
their choices or behaviours in line with agreed social responses. In this regard the 
main problem of economics is not primarily attributed to its utilitarian, rational-choice 
assumptions, but the presupposition of an instrumental relation that precludes 
conceptualizing convergence of preferences while values remain diverged. Thus a 
pluralistic account for economics does not solely rest upon an alternative to utilitarian 
ethics but an alternative to instrumental rationality, such as communicative 
rationality6. 
 According to Habermas (1984), actions of individuals involved in social 
interaction are coordinated through acts of communication directed toward inter-
subjective understanding. They pursue their individual goals under the condition that 
they can harmonize their plans of action with each other on the basis of having, or 
coming to have, a common understanding of the situation they are in (Habermas, 
1984, p. 285). This conception is called communicative rationality, which can be 
defined as the extent to which action is characterized by the reflective understanding 
of competent actors (Dryzek, 1990). Communicative action is oriented not to utility 
6 Nevertheless it can be compatible with utilitarian ethics and instrumental rationality provided that the 
latter are justified in a communicatively rational way. This means such an economics does not 
necessarily preclude certain normative prescriptions of neoclassical economics. 
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maximization nor impartiality, but a creative search for ‘generalizable interests’.  
 Communicative action is coordinated through discussion and socialization of 
individuals. These interactive processes not merely allow expression of perspectives, 
but more importantly create motivation toward cognitive consensus manifested in the 
participants’ desires for their perspectives to have an impact on others (Warren, 1995). 
The idealized conversation is characterized by the intention and capability of the 
interlocutors to discover generalizable interests through speaking and listening to each 
other. In communicative action a speaker seeks to rationally motivate a hearer to 
accept her validity claim under no forces of coercion, manipulation, deception and 
self-deception. They are communicatively competent and free to engage in checking 
and reciprocally reversing perspectives in search of reflective assent.  
Communicative rationality is defined in terms of communicative motivation 
and impact, rather than the expected consequences of the validity claim. It depends on 
the hearer realizing that the action of accepting the validity claim is compatible with 
the knowledge, norms, principles, or rules of social life that have received their 
recognition. Speech plays a role of cognitively reconciling the relations that situate us 
differently in the world. Discussion can then raise the likelihood of enhancements in 
inter-subjective understanding, shared knowledge, and mutual trust. Cooperative 
action is rational to the extent that our differently reasoned interests or perspectives 
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can be generalized to make sense of one another. 
Generalization connects one point to another without displacing it. 
Cooperative action that is communicatively coordinated through a creative search for 
generalizable interests does not require reduction or expansion of one or more 
discourses7. Agreement or convergence on subjective values is not a requirement of 
convergence of expressed preferences and selection of mutually acceptable options. 
This sort of cooperative action is termed ‘workable agreement’, which involves 
individuals agreeing on a course of action while disagreeing on reasons that support it 
(Dryzek, 2000).  
Communication is a key aspect of economic life largely unrecognized in 
economics beyond game-theoretic formulations (Kesting, 2010). A promising 
pluralistic account for economics will gain strengths by associating with the concept 
of communicative rationality whose normative validity and explanatory power 
increase with diversity of values. Identifying generalizable interests is important when 
the structural components of conflicting discourses can only be ‘bridged’ but not 
reduced to each other. When competent actors are motivated to seek recognition 
across discursive divide and enter into a cognitive consensus, collective process of 
7 Discourse refers to a set of categories and concepts embodying specific assumptions, judgments, 
contentions, dispositions, and capabilities (Dryzek and Niemeyer, 2008). Subjective values and beliefs 
are key elements of discourse and can be solicited to approximate political discourses (Dryzek and 
Niemeyer, 2006). Although I refer to ‘subjective value’ and ‘discourse’ interchangeably, actual political 
discourses typically contain a more complex set of meanings and prescriptions than the non-exhaustive 
accounts that are presented and labeled as ‘subjective value’ in this paper .  
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resource allocation or distribution is geared toward production of workable 
agreement. Affirmative outcome is interpreted not as a product of utilitarian 
calculations but in terms of the ways in which such considerations are articulated, 
represented and addressed to the non-utilitarian world; therefore it might be explained 
in terms common to utilitarian and non-utilitarian considerations. The use of language 
in economic life is a basic analytical unit of pluralistic economics. Scholarly inquiries 
should focus on the reciprocal speech acts of generalization of interests on the part of 
economic actors. 
Lo and Spash (in press) suggest that DMV should aim for workable agreement 
and adopt a different interpretation of stated monetary value. In DMV the valuing 
agents seek mutually acceptable solutions to issues such as the use of a pricing 
mechanism, the format and level of payment, and allocation of raised funds. There is 
no necessity of predefining the stated value as an economic construct. Consensual 
decision on WTP 8  is desired, but unanimous consensus is not deemed to be an 
imperative. Nor is transformation of subjective values a condition. Rather, it is 
understood as enhancement of sharing of subjective values without erasing their 
moral differences. In that case, cognitive engagements in subjective values on the part 
of the deliberating individuals fluctuate, yet globally producing no net change in 
8 Four types of WTP are identified by Spash (2007). Two of them are more consistent with the concepts 
developed here than the other two, but none can be completely excluded. 
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group outcome. To illustrate, Table 1 shows the changes in value sets of two 
hypothetical individuals. After deliberation the individuals become more sympathetic 
to each other’s position (levels of engagement increase from 0 – 50). Mathematically 
these movements cancel out each other, producing a combined effect of no net change 
(the average levels of engagement remain 50). A workable agreement involves this 
sort of sharing of values coupled with convergence on expressed preferences. It is 
based on enhancing reciprocity which goes with some degree of diversity retained.  
 
Table 1 About Here 
 
This idea is illustrated with a case study of small-group deliberations. Data 
were collected from a designed deliberative forum about the carbon pricing policy of 
Australia and analysed to ascertain the impacts of deliberation. The research 
investigates the extent in which the choice of carbon pricing mechanism and the 
stated values can be understood in terms of workable agreement. The next section 
describes the background of the case study and the design of the deliberative forum, 
followed by the method of analysis.  
 
3.  Australia’s Carbon Pricing Plans and Public Concerns 
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In 2008, the Australian Government officially proposed a national emission trading 
scheme (ETS),  (Australian Government, 2008). Lacking support from the Green and 
Liberal parties, the ETS was not passed by the Senate in December 2009. In April 
2010 the Government decided to delay further attempts at introduction of an ETS. 
Kevin Rudd was forced to step down as Prime Minister partly for his decision to defer 
the ETS. The Leader of the Opposition, who opposed carbon pricing, almost won the 
ensuing federal election. The incumbent Prime Minister, Julia Gillard, managed to 
form a minority government. In July 2011, the Gillard Government released the 
“Clean Energy Plan” (CEP) including elements of a carbon tax (Australian 
Government, 2011). It is however merely a short prelude to an ETS (Lo and Spash, 
2012; Spash and Lo, 2012).  
Both the ETS and the CEP encountered substantial legislative hurdles, fuelled 
by the rising public concerns about the economic impacts of radical climate actions. 
According to the Lowy Institute Poll (Hanson, 2008, 2010), in 2006 68% of 
Australians agreed that global warming was a serious and pressing problem and 
immediate actions were needed, regardless of the significance of the costs. These 
figures contracted to 60% of respondents in 2008, 48% in 2009 and 46% in 2010 
(Hanson 2010, p. 14). About 7% of respondents did not accept actions that might put 
the economy at risk and would only support actions after general public and political 
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consensus was reached about the negative impacts of global warming. Approximately 
8% (2008) and 13% of respondents (both 2009 and 2010) shared this view. The 
majority of the Australian public (52%) were willing to pay no more than $20 per 
month on electricity bills to tackle climate change (Hanson, 2008). About 19% would 
pay more than that but 21% were not prepared to pay.  
In Australia there is a continuing struggle over the priority of climate 
protection in relation to economic development, and over emission trading vs. carbon 
tax. In July 2010, Gillard had called for a high-profile “citizens’ assembly” as part of 
her election promise to seek community consensus on a GHG mitigation policy9. The 
present study is based on a similar initiative independently designed and conducted 
one week after Gillard’s announcement (and one year before announcement of the 
CEP).   
 
4. Study Design 
4.1 A citizens deliberation on carbon pricing policy 
A deliberative workshop was held in the CSIRO Discovery Centre in Canberra in 31st 
July 2010. Participants included twenty ordinary citizens from Australian Capital 
Territory and four from New South Wales. Participant selection was mainly based on 
9 However, less than three months later, Julia Gillard announced withdrawal of the idea of citizens 
assembly in favour of a multiparty climate change committee. 
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perspectives about emission trading and its alternatives expressed in a preliminary 
survey administered through email. They were involved in a series of group 
discussions on carbon pricing and clean energy financing issues. Practical objectives 
were to evaluate current government efforts, consider the future of Australian 
emission mitigation policy and assess its potential economic implications. The 
workshop comprised four expert presentations on relevant topics, which included the 
science of climate change, the economics of climate change and policy implications, 
international climate politics, and the economics of emission trading and carbon tax.  
Group discussions included three sessions. The first session focused on 
‘Concern about climate change’, where the participants defined the problem at hand 
and expressed their views about general issues, such as Australia’s responsibility in 
greenhouse gas reduction, and relative importance of emission mitigation. The theme 
of the second session was ‘Carbon pricing’, immediately following the expert session 
on emission trading. The discussion explored the merits of the four possible carbon 
pricing arrangements, namely, emission trading, carbon tax, voluntary carbon 
offsetting, and no action (‘no carbon pricing on human activities is needed’). In the 
third session, the participants considered a range of WTP issues under the theme of 
‘Financing low-emission energy technologies’. This session involved a focused 
discussion on their willingness to financially contribute to research and development 
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of low-emission energy technologies. Participants formed three small groups to 
discuss under facilitation. 
Participants completed a questionnaire at the beginning and the end of the 
workshop. Survey tasks included ranking the above mentioned four carbon pricing 
options (from most preferred to least preferred), stating a maximum monthly WTP for 
emission mitigation for the next five years, and evaluating 22 statements based on a 
nine-point scale (from strongly agree to strongly disagree). The statements captured 
current opinions flowing around the actual debate about climate change and related 
institutions. These spread across three main themes, namely, importance of climate 
mitigation, expected role of the government and markets, and potential implications 
of official carbon pricing. The questionnaire was piloted to ensure clarity and 
relevance.  
 
4.2 Analysis of Subjective Values 
Responses to the 22 statements were analyzed using the Q methodology (Brown, 
1980; McKeown and Thomas, 1988) with methodological variations noted below. Q 
methodology investigates a person’s communication of her points of view within an 
internal frame of reference. Every response is understood within the context of its 
relationship with the other responses. Q involves participants’ sorting a purposively 
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sampled set of stimuli, called Q sample (in this study, the 22 statements). Each 
participant is confronted the Q sample and ranks order them within a specified 
distribution, which is usually coded with a scale from ‘most agree’ to ‘most disagree’. 
The rank-ordered set is called a ‘Q sort’.  
Q sorts are factor analyzed. Coherent patterns among the participants are 
identified by correlating individual Q sorts against one another. Unlike conventional 
factor analysis, individuals, rather than traits or Q-sample items, are taken as variables 
to be correlated. Resulting factors represent assembled points of view, or discourses. 
Each identified discourse consists of a distinct set of responses and represents 
categories described similarly by those individuals who are significantly ‘loaded’ on 
the same factor. Factor loadings are essentially correlation coefficients, indicating the 
extent that each Q sort is similar or dissimilar to the composite factor.  
Factor interpretation is based on factor scores. Factor scores for each factor are 
the scores gained by each Q statement and calculated as a weighted average (usually 
normalized for direct comparison); they yield a composite factor that models a 
hypothetical individual who has a 100% loading on the factor. The statements are 
substantially significant relative to the factor; the interpretation of each statement, 
therefore, is subject to the dynamic of all statements as rank-ordered by the 
respondents, i.e. self-referent. Examination of significant factors, or ‘typical 
 23 
discourses’, is an interpretative activity. This involves elaboration on the overall 
patterns and interrelationships of those statements as rank-ordered in the idealized Q 
sorts that indicate distinct viewpoints and attitudes.  
One reason for employing this methodology for this study is that Q can work 
with a small sample size (e.g. 12) and does not pursue demographic representation 
(Davies and Hodge, 2012). A more important reason is that the treatment involved in 
Q requires more than agglomeration across atomistic individuals, but communication 
of viewpoints among them as if they are ‘deliberating’. Q sorts, which represent the 
individuals’ viewpoints, are analysed by computing their correlations. Factors are then 
identified as a result of these statistical interactions between Q sorts. This 
methodological treatment effectively enables communication of viewpoints and is 
amenable to the concept of communicative rationality (Dryzek, 1990). It can help 
illustrate what is expected from a communicatively rational deliberation as defined in 
terms set out in Section 2.3. 
The present study varies from the standard practice in two aspects. First, 
statements were freely distributed, although statistically this does not dramatically 
impact on the quality of results (Cottle and McKeown, 1980). Second, only 22 
statements were employed, well below the standard range of 40 to 60. Consequently 
the discourses identified may not be exhaustive.  
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 5. Deliberative Impacts on Expressed Preferences and Values 
Each subject completed the questionnaire in two sessions, yielding 48 Q sorts. The Q 
sorts were factor analyzed as a single block using principal component method 
followed by varimax rotation. Variations in factor loadings, preference rankings and 
stated WTPs as a result of deliberation were reported as follows. 
 
5.1 Preference ranking and WTP 
Both before and after deliberation, the subjects generally indicated a preference for 
official carbon pricing, in favour of unofficial/no pricing (Table 2). By aggregate 
ranking a carbon tax was preferred, which received 12 primary votes, 3 votes ahead of 
emission trading. The consistently lower rankings of voluntary offsetting and ‘no 
pricing’ indicated a general affinity for official carbon pricing. However, two subjects 
held completely opposite views (Nancy and Mike10). They did not believe that it is 
fair for Australia to curb greenhouse gas emissions and refused to answer the WTP 
question. It was believed to be a protest against the scenario11.  
 
10 All participant names were assigned to preserve anonymity.  
11 They believed that Australia’s contribution to global GHG emission is minimal and climate change is 
not human induced. It does not appear that they saw global emission mitigation as unnecessary, but 
more of a decline of responsibility on some moral grounds (e.g. cost distributional justice, fairness in 
the absence of global action). 
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Table 2 About Here 
 
 Deliberation did not change the aggregate ranking. Participants continued to 
struggle over carbon tax and emission trading. The most preferred option (carbon tax) 
showed the greatest movement in sum of rank. It was chosen by more people as 
principal option, yielding a net increase from 12 to 16 votes, or 50% to 62% of the 
total 12 , suggesting that an agreement on expressed preferences was under 
development. Mike, who once rejected carbon pricing, contributed to the increasing 
support. Some ranked ‘no carbon pricing’ more favourably (Cynthia, Kate, Ross and 
Sarah). This does not match their relatively high WTPs, but seems to reflect a reduced 
preference for its alternatives, namely, voluntary offsetting or emission trading. WTP 
went down in eight cases and up in just four. Both of the protest bidders returned a 
positive WTP, indicating a qualitative convergence in willingness to pay. Note that, 
nevertheless, ‘no carbon pricing’ remained their first or second preference. 
 
5.2 Subjective discourses 
The Q sorts captured the subjects’ values and beliefs about climate change and 
mitigation. Factor analysis extracted three factors. An extracted factor represents a set 
12 One individual (Dan) ranked three options as first preference, raising the number of primary votes to 
26. 16/26 = 62% 
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of idealized perspectives constituting a distinct discourse and is defined in terms of 
the factor scores (Table 3). Each of the three discourses is identified with a label (The 
numbers in the brackets refer to statement numbers in Table 3): 
 
Managed Marketization (Factor A). This discourse accepts the science of human-
induced climate change as valid and sees mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions as 
necessary (1, 6, 18). It affirms the potential of the markets and commercial 
investments in mitigation (7, 21), in favour of direct regulation (17). Nevertheless this 
market liberal discourse does not resist administrative measures. There is some 
confidence in a bigger government with no strong concern on transparency issues (4, 
12). Compulsory contribution from households and businesses is supported (8, 9). An 
important yardstick is actual consequences, in terms of mitigative effects and global 
influence (2, 22). The discourse demands that governments set agenda and enforce 
targets, while enabling the markets to meet these targets efficiently. It captures the 
core features of cap-and-trade mechanisms. Factor loadings on this discourse are 
statistically higher for those who ranked emission trading as the most preferred option 
(t = 3.573, p < 0.01). This means that its adherents prefer emission trading to its 
alternatives. 
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Strong Government (Factor B). This discourse also affirms the science of human-
induced climate change and stresses the need to respond (1, 6, 18). It runs into a 
different direction by holding stronger resistance to market-based approach (7, 21). 
Preference goes to direct regulation (17), but it is conditioned upon the balance of 
regulation and bureaucracy and the openness of the system (4, 12). Commitment to 
climate protection does not depend on actual global impacts through influencing other 
countries (16) nor, at least not strongly, a guarantee of a level of emission reduction 
(2). The belief that someone has to pay appears slightly stronger (3, 14, 20). This 
discourse is intrinsically motivated and hostile to the markets which appear better at 
providing extrinsic incentives for management of public goods. State-led regulatory 
programmes are accepted with cautions. Adherents of this discourse lean towards the 
concept of carbon tax (t = 2.686, p < 0.05) 
 
Scepticism (Factor C). Scepticism stands in contrast to the above two discourses. It 
involves a denial of the existence of human-induced climate change and refusal to 
take actions prior to scientific consensus (1, 6, 18). Compulsory contribution from 
households is categorically rejected for increasing their economic burdens (3, 20, 8). 
It seems to be a liberal discourse being pro-market (7, 21) and indifferent to requests 
for more industrial commitments (9, 11, 14). However, it generally supports 
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politicians and administrative solutions (4, 5, 17). The discourse is hostile to global 
citizenship: it does not seek to influence other countries while demanding their 
initiatives (16, 22). Sceptics tend to see no need for pricing carbon (t = 6.804, p < 
0.01).   
 
Table 3 About Here 
 
 Main differences are discernible in terms of trust in the markets and trust in 
science. The two dominant discourses, Managed Marketization and Strong 
Government, share the view that the global climate is changing due to human 
activities. Managed Marketization is characterized by a more pragmatic 
environmentalism emphasizing efficiency and consequences of emission mitigation. 
Carbon pollution is attributed to market failures. Governments should correct the 
markets through proper regulation. Strong Government’s environmentalism is more 
conservative and less consequentialist. The markets are considered inherently flawed, 
so that governments should explore alternatives to avoid repeating failures. 
Scepticism seems to be self-contradictory by containing both pro-market and 
pro-government elements. It envisions an unproblematic harmony encompassing the 
current development modes and the climate. The sceptics believe that the government 
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has done enough. Unlike Managed Marketization, Scepticism does not embrace the 
markets per se. The disposition stems from a belief that there is no more need for the 
government to get involved in emission mitigation beyond existing regulatory efforts. 
This is evidenced by the seemingly contradictory attitude toward the idea of carbon 
pricing. Although Scepticism has expressed confidence in a strong government, this is 
probably because it does not regard the Australian government as failing to address 
global climate change. Strong Government, to the contrary, demands more from the 
government to redeem its failures, and thus remains cautious of politics. 
  
5.3 Changes in values and beliefs 
Table 4 presents the correlation between each subject’s Q sort and the idealized Q sort 
denoting the corresponding factor. The majority of subjects were loaded on either 
Managed Marketization or Strong Government (Factors A and B respectively), and 
many were associated with both at the same time. Scepticism (Factor C) proved to be 
a zone of polarization with a number of negative loadings. Only three mounted on this 
discourse and two of them were strongly held to it.  
 
Table 4 About Here 
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 Deliberation did not change the subjective landscape dramatically. Most of the 
subjects continued to struggle over the two dominant positions and the three sceptics 
remained loaded on Factor C. Although four more subjects agreed with Managed 
Marketization to a significant degree, two more were principally loaded on Strong 
Government. Moreover, three more subjects became associated with two factors, 
leading to an increase in the total number of subjects having double significant factor 
loadings from 15 to 18. The number of subjects in significant agreement did not 
decline across all of the three factors.  
 The post-deliberation relationship between Scepticism and the other two 
discourses is worth noting. The two strong sceptics (Nancy and Mike) experienced a 
substantial growth in affinity for an alternative discourse. Nancy became more 
sympathetic to the Managed Marketization discourse with a correlation 28, rising 
from -24. Mike shared with Strong Government with a correlation 50, rising from -31. 
Other individuals appeared to be impressed by the sceptical perspectives to varying 
extents. Remarkable withdrawal from their pro-climate positions, however, was not 
observed. Take the three observations with the greatest growth in Scepticism as 
examples: Elaine and Phillip had their loadings on a pro-climate discourse increased, 
and Alan became associated with both Factors A and B. Scepticism was not swept 
away. Both Mike and Nancy remained attached to Scepticism, and the reduction in 
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their factor loadings was offset by the subjective growth of other individuals (see also 
Table 5). Kate and Mike (and perhaps Phillip as well) had gained access to two 
competing discourses.  
Table 5 displays the average correlation between subjective positions. The first 
row presents the correlation between subjects and a discursive position, or an 
idealized Q sort. It is computed by averaging the factor loadings on each of the three 
factors, i.e. column average in Table 4. These estimates measure the extent to which 
the individuals adhered to a particular political ideal. Changes in all of the average 
values as a result of deliberation were not statistically significant. There was no 
observed conversion of values leading to global shrinkage or expansion of discourses.  
 
Table 5 About Here 
 
Average correlation between pairs of subject is presented at the bottom of 
Table 5. It is computed by comparing an individual’s value profile with every other’s, 
i.e. correlating each subject’s Q sort to the other 23 participants individually. These 
estimates measure the extent to which the individuals shared with each other in terms 
of subjective experience (inter-subjectivity). The average value significantly increased 
from 53 to 60 (t = 5.702, p < 0.01). This shows that the deliberation has improved 
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inter-subjective understanding between the participants. Nonetheless it did not result 
in a normative consensus, as evidenced by the limited degree of convergence in 
values and beliefs in aggregate terms. The enhancement of inter-subjective coherence 
was not followed by a tendency of normative uniformity.  
 
6. Discussion  
The small-group deliberations enabled communication between competing discourses. 
Changes in subjective values as a result of deliberation did not run parallel to 
expressed preferences. The discourses identified did not diminish, while a consensual 
decision on carbon tax gained progress. The sharing of subjective experiences among 
participants had been enhanced13. A mutual transformative dynamic was operative, 
contributing to the increasing sympathy given to alternative positions. Understandings 
across discursive divide were broadened without erasing differences in values.  
The results can be interpreted in terms of workable agreement. Deliberation 
facilitated expression of support to a course of action. Preference divergence was 
reduced, along with a qualitative improvement in willingness to pay from opponents. 
The carbon tax option managed to secure majority support. All of the participants 
agreed to pay for emission mitigation, including the two climate sceptics who initially 
13 An anonymous reviewer suggests that this argument could be substantiated by including an 
experimental control for repeated measurement without deliberation. 
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refused. These two participants became more sympathetic to an alternative position 
while significant departure from the Scepticism discourse was not observed. This 
occurred under no explicit requirement of reaching consensus during the course of 
deliberation. Reasons supporting their expressed preferences had been communicated 
although divergence in value and belief remained. Some of the participants gained 
access to an alternative position without completely withdrawing from the dominant 
one. Deliberation strengthened inter-subjective understanding, and there was no 
evidence showing a tendency for unilateral movement of subjective dispositions. The 
deliberative generation of mutual understanding contributed to the development of the 
workable agreement.  
The notion of workable agreement seems to be unintelligible to conventional 
models of rationality. The deliberation did not make at least some of the participants 
express a preference in accordance with what their subjective values dictate. Some 
ecological economists would see the increasing sympathy of some participants toward 
Scepticism, which affirms short-term benefits restricted to a smaller group of people 
(i.e. Australians) in contrast to taking comprehensive actions for the global climate, as 
a failed attempt at displacing environmentally unsustainable dispositions through 
group deliberations. This is because the theory predicts a tendency towards public-
interested or impartial considerations (e.g. Sagoff, 1998; Vatn, 2009). As a corollary, 
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the deliberative enlightenment is expected to result in dissipation of the narrow scope 
of Scepticism through the process of ‘discourse migration’ (Hobson and Niemeyer, 
2011). Likewise, neoclassical economists would understand the qualitative 
improvement in WTP of the climate sceptics as merely an irrational response resulting 
from implicit group pressures or poor experimental operation. At best it would be 
relegated to a mistaken observation because they expressed preference for something 
they did not believe in, or not ‘useful’ to them 14. There was a decline in value-
preference consistency both groups of economists seek to strengthen. 
Nonetheless I argue that the results help clarify a structural impediment to the 
reorientation of the framework of economics towards value pluralism. The 
development of workable agreement indicates a sort of rationality endemic in the 
communicative practice of everyday life. Some of the participants were found to be 
able to invoke a bridging rhetoric which proved effective in facilitating deliberation 
across discursive divide (Lo, 2011b)15. The observations can be explicated under the 
framework of discursive democracy (Dryzek, 2000, 2010), which is rooted in the 
theory of communicative action. Communicative rationalization is a better 
explanation of the observed changes in expressed preferences and values. Global 
14 This is a real response from a mainstream economist to this paper presented in a research seminar by 
the author in January 2011. 
15 Transcripts of the reported deliberative workshop provided a clearer picture as to how the workable 
agreement emerged and how the rhetoric functioned as it was invoked, not strategically and perhaps not 
deliberately, during the course of deliberation. The rhetoric invoked was a creative interpretation of 
carbon tax as ‘Medicare for the environment’ and evolved from the natural process of communication 
between some participants. The analysis of transcripts is reported in Lo (2011b) and Lo et al. (in press). 
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shrinkage or expansion of discourses was not observed. Instead, there was 
generalization of interests manifested in the improving mutual recognition with 
respect to both sceptical and pro-climate positions. Transformation of values was 
based on strengthened connection between different subjective positions rather than 
displacement of any one. The deliberative outcome can be considered to be 
communicatively rational and compatible with the concept of value pluralism, 
although some of its attributes do not well accord with economic predictions. 
 
7. Conclusions 
Modern political economy theories attempt to explain political behaviour and 
institution in economic terms. Ecological economics, alternatively, can be oriented to 
the study of economic behaviour and institution in broader political terms. Assessment 
of attitudinal expressions about environmental goods and services in monetary terms 
should move beyond the conventional economic ambits to the extent in which 
people’s perception and motivation toward the financing and economic functioning of 
such public goods contain significant non-economic dimensions. Boundaries of 
environmental discourses are permeable and transformable over time. Every discourse 
has its own ways to construct and express willingness to pay which are shaping and 
reshaping all the way during the course of communicative interaction. Value-
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articulating institutions need a flexible and adaptable shape to order to cope with 
actual variations and conflicts in values.  
In this light, monetary valuation of the environment is reconstructed toward a 
topical and not a methodological concept. DMV is invariably about money and values 
yet allowing varying possibilities of theorization. The methodology is a variable that 
is subject to continual structural deconstruction and reconstruction. It encompasses a 
set of principles and concepts and is not claimed to be a ‘ready-for-use’ technique. 
WTP elicitation is broadly understood as part of a micro-political process and 
expressed monetary WTP as a contingent political construct subject to post-
deliberative interpretation. As a product of a democratic deliberation, its meaning 
should be left open-ended, contingent upon the communicative dynamic and the 
subjective experiences of the valuing agents. In the present study, the WTP is 
interpreted as an outcome of improving mutual understanding across discursive 
divide. 
In this regard the main problem of neoclassical economics is not merely 
attributed to the failure to recognize alternative values. Recognition by some 
ecological economists has been directed toward isolation of a desired conception of 
values, which threatens to repeat the failure of neoclassical economics. The arguments 
against the ethical premises of the neoclassical turned around could constitute a solid 
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attack to the citizen-oriented approach. Self-interested, consumer-type respondents 
may still reasonably indicate dissatisfactions to a citizen frame of valuation, as 
evidenced in Soma and Vatn (2010). A critical issue unaddressed is the negative 
relationship between the capacity of conceptualizing values and the actual diversity of 
values. Building a pluralistic theory of value upon any one pole of a dichotomy is 
doomed to failure because its functioning hinges on rejection of the alternative.  
A pluralistic account for economics entails a positive relationship between 
conceptualizing capacity and diversity, which may be strengthened by shifting the 
present focus from presupposition of substantive morality to that of discourse ethics 
among economic agents viewed as engaging in some form of communicative 
interaction. Analytical efforts on mere expression of preferences support the more 
important inquiries into the creation of cognitive impacts upon each other and 
validation of alternative claims of interest. The latter connote a focus on the ways in 
which expressed economic considerations and their moral alternatives communicate 
towards discovery of generalizable interests. In this light, the deliberative WTP is seen 
as indicative of an expression of support to a cooperative venture, which may be 
termed as ‘agreement to pay’ to denote the mutuality aspect in contrast to ‘willingness 
to pay’ (Lo and Spash, in press). Rationality of group-coordinated economic order or 
decision regarding the use of public goods should be evaluated in terms of the agents’ 
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motivation toward cognitive consensus manifested in the desires for their perspectives 
to have an impact on others. A core principle is generalization of interests, which 
becomes more important when conversion or reduction of normative values proves 
undesirable or formidable. 
Under this framework, deliberative methods are not seen as a moral or 
epistemic transformative device that is primarily used to change what decision makers 
might think as right or true. Enhancing value-preference consistency may indicate 
declining epistemic quality of deliberative outcomes to the extent in which value 
pluralism and consensus are regarded as equally important. Communicatively rational 
deliberation may result in restructuring of disputed preference profiles in a way that 
allows departure from what one’s values or beliefs dictate.  Communicated subjective 
dispositions may indicate a deliberative success regardless of the degree of aggregate 
change in subjective landscape.  
Policy recommendations agreed by diverse groups engaging in deliberative 
decision making processes may not always match the whole spectrum of competing 
perspectives. The outcomes should be evaluated in terms of the quality of the 
dialogical process, among other criteria. The key is not only which value positions are 
included and expressed, but how they are re-interpreted and generalized to each other 
by their proponents and opponents in defending a preferred option. The sharing of 
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discursive beliefs among deliberants is one important criterion for the evaluation of 
deliberatively produced policy recommendations. Communicatively rational 
outcomes are produced through the exercise of informed and cognitively generalized 
reasons. 
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Table 1 Idealized movements in level of engagement in two hypothetic value sets 
 Pre-deliberation Post-deliberation 
 Value Set 1 Value Set 2 Value Set 1 Value Set 2 
Individual A 100 0 50 50 
Individual B 0 100 50 50 
Average 50 50 50 50 
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“Carbon tax” “No carbon tax” 
“Carbon pricing necessary” “Carbon pricing unnecessary” 
Categorical consistency 
maintained 
Agreed actions less likely 
 
Non-diminishing value plurality 
Figure 1 Categorical consistency means that agreement on a course of action is less 
likely when the individuals disagree on values (i.e. value plurality preserved) 
“Carbon tax” 
“Carbon pricing necessary” 
Categorical consistency 
maintained 
Diminishing value plurality 
 
Agreed actions more likely 
Figure 2 Categorical consistency means that agreement on a course of action is likely 
only when the individuals no longer disagree on values (i.e. value plurality diminishing) 
“Carbon pricing necessary” 
Individual A Individual B 
Individual A Individual B 
Subjective 
value position 
Expressed 
preference 
Expressed 
preference 
Subjective 
value position 
“Carbon tax” 
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Table 2 Subjects’ preference ranking and willingness-to-pay (WTP) 
 Pre-deliberation Post-deliberation 
Subject Emission trading 
Carbon 
tax 
Voluntary 
offsetting 
No 
carbon 
pricing 
WTP 
(AUD) 
Emission 
trading 
Carbon 
tax 
Voluntary 
offsetting 
No 
carbon 
pricing 
WTP 
(AUD) 
Alan 2 1 3 4 200 2 1 3 4 200 
Brian 2 1 3 4 200 3 1 2 4 200 
Claire 2 1 3 4 50 2 1 3 4 50 
Cynthia 4 1 4 4 100 2 1 3 2 100 
Dan 2 3 1 4 500 1 1 1 4 50 
Dave 2 1 3 4 100 2 1 3 4 100 
Elaine 1 2 3 4 100 1 2 3 4 100 
George 1 2 3 4 Not specified 1 2 3 4 25 
Helen 1 2 3 4 71 2 1 3 4 80 
Howard 1 2 3 4 30 2 1 3 4 23 
Ian 1 2 3 4 100 2 1 3 4 50 
James 2 1 3 4 120 2 1 3 4 150 
John 1 2 3 4 50 1 2 3 4 20 
Kate 2 1 3 4 150 2 1 4 3 150 
Kevin 1 2 3 4 100 1 2 3 4 90 
Liana 2 1 3 4 100 2 1 3 4 100 
Mark 1 2 3 4 20 1 2 3 4 4 
Mike 4 3 2 1 Refused 3 1 4 2 20 
Nancy 4 4 4 1 Refused 2 4 3 1 5 
Phillip 2 1 3 4 50 2 1 3 4 50 
Ross 2 1 3 4 200 2 1 4 3 200 
Sarah 3 1 2 4 100 4 1 2 3 85 
Stephanie 2 1 3 4 50 1 2 3 4 50 
Wilson 1 2 3 4 100 1 2 3 4 70 
Sum of 
rank 46 40 70 90  44 34 71 86  
Aggregate 
rank 2 1 3 4  2 1 3 4  
Principal 
option 
(No. of 
votes) 
9 12 1 2  8 16 1 1  
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Table 3 Factor scores  
No. Description Statement Factor 
A B C 
1 Mitigation 
impacts 
National GHG emissions should be considerably 
reduced. 
4 4 -4 
2 Certainty of 
impact 
An emission reduction scheme should involve a 
guarantee that a certain level of reduction will be 
achieved. 
4 2 -1 
3 Costs to 
households 
Additional costs to households should be avoided. 0 -1 4 
4 Bureaucracy A government-led reduction scheme would create 
bureaucracy and should be avoided. 
-4 0 -4 
5 Trust in politics We can’t rely on the government to reduce GHG 
emissions. I don’t trust politicians. 
-1 0 -4 
6 Scientific 
consensus 
We do not yet have consensus on the science of 
climate change and so should not take action to 
reduce greenhouse emissions. 
-4 -3 4 
7 Efficiency Market-based approach should be used to ensure 
efficiency (i.e. lowest possible cost for a given level 
of emission reduction). 
4 -4 3 
8 Compulsory share 
(household) 
Reducing GHG emissions should involve a 
compulsory share by households 
3 3 -4 
9 Compulsory share 
(business) 
Reducing GHG emissions should involve a 
compulsory share by businesses 
4 4 0 
10 Continuity Climate policy should involve political certainty, 
e.g. not easily affected by change of government. 
4 4 4 
11 Compliance We need a system that enforces compliance of 
companies to reduce GHG emissions 
4 4 0 
12 Transparency Emissions reduction policy should be transparent 
and easy to understand by all.  
0 4 4 
13 The poor pay less Lower-income families should contribute 
proportionally less to emission reduction. 
3 4 4 
14 The industry pay 
more 
Energy-intensive industries should be responsible 
for the costs of emission reduction. 
2 3 0 
15 Cost transfer Businesses should not pass the costs of emission 
reduction on to consumers.  
0 0 0 
16 Global action We should not take action if other countries do not 
do the same. 
0 -4 4 
17 Direct regulation Direct regulation is more effective than any form of 
carbon pricing. 
-4 3 3 
18 Human 
contributions 
The effect of humans on climate is small. Reducing 
emissions is not a priority. 
-4 -4 3 
19 Fairness It is only fair that every Australian helps to reduce 
GHG emissions. 
3 4 2 
20 No tax I already pay enough tax, we don’t need a new one. -3 -4 4 
21 Profit allowed Companies should be allowed to make profit by 
reducing their own GHG emissions. 
4 0 3 
22 Global influence Our climate policy should be able to affect other 
countries’ decisions on emissions reduction. 
3 3 -3 
Eigenvalue  16.83 17.13 3.92 
Note: Level of agreement based on a 9-point scale (-4 = strongly disagree to 4 = strong agree)  
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Table 4 Subjects’ Factor Loadings (x100) 
Note: * denotes significance, which is determined by standard error = 1/sqrtN (Brown, 1980), 
where N denotes number of statements. At the 95% level, significance cut-off is around 40 
(1.95 x 1/sqrt22). 
 Pre-deliberation  Post-deliberation 
Subject A  B  C  A  B  C  
Alan 34   75 * -32  56 * 70 * 4   
Brian 63 * 71 * -13  42 * 88 * -11  
Claire 73 * 59 * 18  83 * 29  4  
Cynthia 24   89 * -18   42 * 85 * -13   
Dan 37   67 * 19   49 * 77 * -16   
Dave 64 * 60 * -19  67 * 66 * -15  
Elaine 58 * 49 * -29  73 * 51 * -1  
George 73 * 39   -6   78 * 41 * -15   
Helen 54 * 77 * 1  69 * 69 * 8  
Howard 77 * 50 * 10   75 * 58 * -12   
Ian 63 * 58 * 11   71 * 54 * 5   
James 71 * 56 * -4  50 * 65 * -4  
John 80 * 32   -4   82 * 21   -2   
Kate 33   46 * 59 * 54 * 12   44 * 
Kevin 68 * 64 * 23  58 * 74 * 9  
Liana 39  85 * -13  55 * 72 * -3  
Mark 74 * 52 * 0   80 * 45 * -5   
Mike -10  -31  87 * -10  50 * 58 * 
Nancy -24   -12   90 * 28   -16   72 * 
Phillip 35   29   -24   61 * 5   38   
Ross 56 * 69 * -19  38  74 * -2  
Sarah 51 * 66 * 4   19   92 * 20   
Stephanie 70 * 59 * 2   68 * 62 * -12   
Wilson 81 * 47 * 17   62 * 64 * 23   
No. of subjects 
in significant 
agreement 
16  19  3  20  19 
 
3  
Principal factor 12  8  3  12  10  2  
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Table 5 Average correlations between subjective positions 
Average correlation (x100) Pre-deliberation Post-deliberation 
Between subjects and a 
discursive position 
Factor Factor 
A B C A B C 
52 52 7 56 54 7 
Between pairs of subjects 53 60* 
* p < 0.01 
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